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Abstract: In recent years companies are paying more attention on Business Continuity Management. 
BCM focuses both on potential threats identification and on management of unexpected block process. 
These two aspects are the basis of High Reliability Organization. The HRO paradigm was developed 
several years ago in high-risk organizations. It integrates two relevant approaches: preventing unexpected 
events and resilient organizations. The aim of this study is to define a rough but effective approach to 
support HROs in evaluating their most “compliant” maintenance approaches. The main phases of the 
study are: the identification of the main HRO features (both prevention and resilient ones), the 
identification of the main maintenance approaches used to date and finally the evaluation of their 
compliance according to HRO features. The paper presents a new method to evaluate the different 
maintenance approaches: in addition to productivity, it’s also considered the necessity to guarantee 
production conti uity following unpredictable events. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Business continuity is becoming relevant for companies 
(Giacchero et al., 2013). Firms have to provide products (or 
services) even in the case of unexpected events. Business 
continuity management considers risk factors and actions for 
preventing them efficiently and quickly. These two aspects 
are the basis of High Reliability Organization paradigm. This 
paradigm was developed by a group of researchers at the 
Barkley campus of University of California (Rochlin et al, 
1987) (Hopkins, 2007). The HRO paradigm has been applied 
to promote and ensure safety in complex conditions; it 
proposes a more optimistic mind-set from what has been 
pointed out by Perrow’s pessimistic contribution (Perrow, 
1984, Hopkins, 1999) defining that accidents characterized 
by tight coupling and interactive complexity will be normal 
or inevitable as they often cannot be foreseen or prevented. 
The HRO point of view, instead, argued that high-hazard 
organizations can safely operate although a high level of 
complexity (Weick et al., 1999). The integration of 
preventive and resilient approaches is the pillar of the HRO 
paradigm in safety management (Schulman, 2004). The aim 
of the study is to evaluate how current maintenance strategies 
“fit” the HRO paradigm; the analysis will support a more 
clear comprehension of impacts derived by the HRO 
paradigm application in complex companies. The paper is 
organized as follows: in section 1 and 2, the HRO paradigm 
is described. In section 3 a first analysis about how HRO 
features could be “translate” to the maintenance field is 
proposed. Next, the definition of the main maintenance 
approaches and the “rough” analysis about how each 
approach is compliant with HRO paradigm, are proposed in 
sections 4 and 5. 
2. “HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANISATIONS” 
PARADIGM: A BRIEF SUMMARY 
A recent definition of the HRO paradigm is: “These are a 
family of organizations that operate continuously under 
trying conditions and have fewer than their fair share of 
major accidents. These high reliability organizations practice 
a form of organizing that reduces the brutality of audits 
[accidents] and speeds up the recovery process” (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). Two main pillars characterize HROs (Saleh, 
2010), such as: 
The Prevention approach: Prevention requires that 
organisational members try to anticipate and identify the 
events and occurrences that must not happen, identify all 
possible precursor events that may lead to them and then 
create a set of procedures for avoiding them (Schulman, 
2004). One limitation is that you cannot write procedures to 
anticipate all the situations and conditions that shape people’s 
work. Moreover, even if procedures could be written for 
every situation, there are costs of added complexity that come 
with too many rules. This complexity increases the likelihood 
that people will lose flexibility in the face of extensive rules 
and procedures. Reliability is far broader: it requires 
resilience as well as prevention (Sutcliffe, 2011); 
The Resilience approach: HROs are unique in that they 
understand that reliability is not the outcome of 
organisational invariance, but rather, results from a 
continuous management of fluctuations in job performance 
and human interactions (Weick et al., 1999) (Schulman, 
2004). The essence of resilience is the intrinsic ability of an 
organisation (team, unit, system, etc.) to maintain or regain a 
dynamically stable state, which allows it to continue 
operations in the presence of a continuous stress and/or after 
a major mishap (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). An HRO is not 
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anticipate all the situations and conditions that shape people’s 
work. Moreover, even if procedures could be written for 
every situation, there are costs of added complexity that come 
with too many rules. This complexity increases the likelihood 
that people will lose flexibility in the face of extensive rules 
and procedures. Reliability is far broader: it requires 
resilience as well as prevention (Sutcliffe, 2011); 
The Resilience approach: HROs are unique in that they 
understand that reliability is not the outcome of 
organisational invariance, but rather, results from a 
continuous management of fluctuations in job performance 
and human interactions (Weick et al., 1999) (Schulman, 
2004). The essence of resilience is the intrinsic ability of an 
organisation (team, unit, system, etc.) to maintain or regain a 
dynamically stable state, which allows it to continue 
operations in the presence of a continuous stress and/or after 
a major mishap (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). An HRO is not 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Business continuity is becoming relevant for companies 
(Giacchero et al., 2013). Firms have to provide products (or 
services) even in the case of unexpected ev nts. Business 
continuity ma agement considers risk factors a d actions for 
preventing them fficiently and quickly. These two aspects 
ar  the basis of High R liability Organization paradigm. This 
paradigm was develop d y a group of researchers at the 
Barkley campus of University of California (Rochlin et al, 
1987) (Hopkins, 2007). The HRO paradigm has been applied 
to promote and ensure safety in complex conditions; it 
pro oses a more optimistic mind-set from what has been 
ointed out by Perrow’s pessimistic contribution (Perrow, 
1984, H pkins, 1999) defining that accidents charact rized 
by tight coupling and interactive complexity will be normal 
or inevitable as they often cannot be foreseen or prevented. 
The HRO point of view, instead, argued that high-hazard 
organizations can safely operate altho gh a high level of 
complexity (Weick et al., 1999). The integration f 
preventive and r silient approaches is the pillar of the HRO 
aradigm in safety management (Schulman, 2004). The aim 
of the study i  to evaluate how current mai tenance strategies 
“fit” the HRO paradigm; the analysis will support a more 
clear comprehension of imp cts derived by the HRO 
par digm applicati  in co lex companies. The paper is 
org nized s follows: i  section 1 and 2, th  HRO paradigm 
is described. In sectio  3 a first alysis about how HRO 
features could be “translate” to the maintenance field is 
proposed. Next, the definition of the main maintenance 
appr aches and t  “rough” analysis about how ea h 
r  is compliant with HRO p radigm, are pr posed in 
secti ns 4 and 5. 
2. “HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANISATIONS” 
PARADIGM: A BRIEF SUMMARY 
A recent definition of the HRO paradigm is: “These are a 
family of organizations that operate continuously under 
trying c nditions and have fewer than their fair share of 
major acci ents. These igh reliability organizations practice 
a form of organizing that r duces the brutality of udits 
[accidents] and speeds up th  re overy process” (Weick & 
Sut liffe, 2007). Two main pillars characteriz  HROs (Saleh, 
2010), such as: 
The Prevention approach: Prevention requires that 
organisational members try to anticipate and identify the 
events nd occurrence  that must not happen, identify all 
possible precursor ev nts that may lead to them and then 
create a set of procedures for avoiding them (Schulman, 
2004). One limitati n is that you cannot writ  proced res to 
anticipate all the situations nd conditions that shape people’s 
work. Moreover, even if procedures could be written for 
every situati n, there are costs of added mplexity that come 
with too many rul s. This complexity in reases the likelihood 
that pe ple will lo e flexibility in the fac  of ext nsive rules 
and proc dures. Reliability is far broader: it r quir s 
resilience as w ll as prevention (Sutcliffe, 2011); 
The Resilienc  approach: HROs are unique in that they 
understand that reliability is not the outcome of 
organis tional invariance, but rather, results from a 
continuous management of fluctuations in job performance 
and h man interactio s (Wei k et al., 1999) (Schulman, 
2004). The essence of resilience is the intrinsic ability of an 
organisation (team, unit, ystem, etc.) to maintain or regain a 
dynamically st ble state, which allows it to continue 
operations in the presenc  of a continuous stress and/ r after 
a major mishap (Sutcliff  & Vogus, 2003). An HRO is not 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Busin s continuity is b c ming relevant for compa ie  
(Giacchero et al., 2013). Firms have to pr vide product  (  
ser ices) even in the case of unexpected events. Bu ines  
continuity management considers isk factors and actions for 
reventing them efficiently and quickly. These two aspects 
are th  basis of High Reliability Organization paradigm. This 
paradigm was developed by a group of research rs at the 
Barkley campus of University of California (R chlin et al, 
1987) (Hopkins, 2007). The HRO paradigm has been appli d 
to prom te and nsure safety in omplex conditions; it 
proposes a more optimistic mind-set from what has be n 
pointed out by Perrow’s pessimistic contribution (Per ow, 
1984, Hopkins, 1999) defining that accidents charact rized 
by tight coupli g and interactive complexity will be normal 
 inevitable as they often cannot be foreseen or prevented. 
The HRO point of vi w, instead, argued that high-hazard 
o ganizations can safely operate although a high l vel of 
complexity ( eick et al., 1999). The integration of 
prev ntive and resilient approa hes is the pill r of the HRO 
paradigm in safety managem nt (Schulman, 2004). The aim 
of the study is to evaluate how current maintenance strategies 
“fit” the HRO paradigm; the analysis will support  more 
clear comprehension of impacts erived by the HRO 
paradigm application in complex companies. The paper is 
organized as follows: in ection 1 and 2, the HRO paradigm 
is described. In section 3 a first analysis bout how HRO 
features could be “translate” to the maintenance field is 
prop sed. Next, the definition of the ain maintenance 
appr aches and the “rough” analysis about how each 
approach is compliant with HRO paradigm, are proposed in 
sections 4 and 5. 
2. “HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANISATIONS” 
PARADIG : A BRIEF SU ARY 
A recent definition of the HRO paradigm is: “The e are a 
family of organizations that operate co tinuously under 
trying c nditions a d have fewer than their fair share of 
major accide ts. Th se high r liability organizations practice 
a form of organizing that reduces the brutality of audits 
[accidents] nd speeds up the recovery process” ( eick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). Two main pillars characterize HROs (Saleh, 
2010), such as: 
The Prevention approach: Prevention requires that 
organisational members try to anticipate and identify the 
events nd occurrences that must not happ n, identify all 
possible precursor events that may lead to them and then 
create a set of procedures for avoidi g them (Schulman, 
2004). One limitation is that you cannot write procedures to 
anticipate all the situations and conditions that shape people’s 
ork. oreover, even if procedures ould be written f r 
every situation, ther  are costs of add d compl ity that come 
with too many rules. This complexity inc e ses the lik lihood 
that people will lo e flexibility in the face of extensive rules 
and procedures. Reliability is far broader: it requires 
resilience as well as prevention (Sutcliffe, 2011); 
The Resilience app oach: HROs re unique in that they 
understand that reliability is not the outcome of 
organisational invariance, but rather, results fro  a 
continuous manag ment of fluctuations in job performance 
and human interactions ( eick et al., 1999) (Schulman, 
2004). The es ence of resilience is the intrinsic ability of an 
rganisation (team, unit, system, etc.) t  maintain or reg in a 
dyn mically stable stat , which allows it to continue 
operations in the presence of a continuous stress and/or after 
a major mishap (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). An HRO is not 
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error-free but that errors do not disable it. HROs prevent and 
manage mishaps before they can spread throughout the 
system, thus, causing widespread damage or failure. These 
abilities are generally traced to dynamic organising principles 
(Weick et al., 1999). HROs have mechanisms for monitoring 
and reporting small signals that the system may be breaking 
down. Furthermore, they have the flexibility and the 
capabilities to respond in real time, reorganising resources 
and actions to maintain functioning in spite of failures 
(Sutcliffe, 2011). 
2.1 Basic characteristics of High Reliability 
Organisations 
Lekka (2011) suggest a mind map depicting HRO 
characteristics as an overarching organising framework: the 
proposed mind map identifies five categories except for the 
“definition” one, of HRO features as depicted in Figure 1 and 
described in Table 1. 
 
 Figure 1. Mind Map of High Reliability Organization 
processes and characteristics (source Lekka, 2011) 
Table 1: HRO categories and main features 
HRO categories Main features 
Just Culture: it refers to a strategic 
approach that promotes both 
organizational learning and highly 
reliable operations 
a. Open reporting system of near misses/accidents 
b. Individual accountability 
c. Abandon work on safety ground 
d. Open discussion of errors 
Mindful leadership:  it refers to a 
strategic business orientation aiming to 
avoid both prevent quickly manage 
unexpected events with high 
consequence for company 
productivity.   
a. Bottom up communication of bad news 
b. Proactive Audits 
c. Management by exception 
d. Safety production balance 
e. Engagement with front-line staff 
f. Investment of resources 
Problem Anticipation:  it refers to the 
firm’s capability of forecasting 
unexpected events that could heavily 
affect business continuity. 
a. Preoccupation with failure 
b. Reluctance to simplify 
c. Sensitivity to operations 
Containment of unexpected events:  
it refers to the firm’s capability to 
respond quickly to unforeseen events 
and to contain its consequences. 
a. Commitment to resilience 
b. Defence to expertise/Oscillation between 
hierarchical and flat structures 
c. Redundancy. 
Learning Orientation: it refers to 
firms’ activities that involves both 
preventive and resilient approaches. 
a. Continuous Technical Training 
b. Open Communication 
c. Root Cause Analysis of accidents/incidents 
d. Procedures Reviewed 
3. HRO COMPLIANT MAINTENANCE 
APPROACHES 
In order to check if the main maintenance approaches 
identified are consistent with the “reliability-enhancing” 
HRO characteristics, the temporal sequence of HRO 
approaches was transferred from the safety field to the 
maintenance one. From the safety point of view, five 
temporal phases have been considered in the safety 
management process, and three “safety” critical events, that 
have to be managed, have been identified (alarms, near 
misses and accidents). The five temporal phases are described 
in Table 2. 
Table 2. Temporal phases of Safety Management Process 
Normal 
condition 
it’s the phase in which business processes are carried out under normal 
conditions; in this phase HROs carry out monitoring and prevention 
activities 
Alarm it’s the phase in which HRO identify and manage alarms for avoiding the 
happening of unexpected events. Alarms are all unsafe events, in terms of 
workers’ behaviours or workplace conditions (Gnoni et al., 2013); 
Near miss it’s the phase in which HRO identify, analyse and correct Near Misses to 
prevent accidents (Gnoni et al., 2013); 
Accident it’s the phase in which an Accident happens and HROs carry out resilient 
activities to contain the negative consequences; 
Post-
accident 
it’s the phase in which HROs carry out root causes analysis to learn from 
unexpected events occurred to improve prevention activities. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the HRO prevention approach is 
developed in four temporal phases, such as Normal 
Condition, Alarms, Near Miss and Post-Accident; on the 
other hand, the HRO resilient approach is applied only in the 
Accident phase.  
  
Figure 2. Temporal sequences of HRO approaches 
Similarly to the safety field, from the maintenance point of 
view, the main temporal phases of its process have been 
defined; these are Normal Condition, Alarms, Anomalies, 
Fault e Post-Fault. The HRO resilient approach is present in 
the Fault phase, while the HRO prevention approach is 
typical of the other phases. Also in this field, three 
“maintenance” critical events have been identified (Alarms, 
Anomalies, Fault); these are described in Table 3. 
Table 3. Description of Maintenance critical events 
Event Description 
Alarm 
which are unexpected changes of the parameters of a 
machine that does not involve operating anomalies, but 
if not managed, could generate them; 
Anomalies 
which are deviations from the normal operation of the 
machine that involve process deviations, symptomatic 
of a machinery malfunction; 
Faults 
which are damages or breakages, which compromise 
the regular functioning of a machine, generating its 
stop. 
In this step of the work is important to identify both 
operational and strategic HRO features. A framework 
proposal is summarized in Figure 3: the strategic HRO 
features are transversal to all the five phases. The proposed 
framework will be used to evaluate how maintenance 
approaches meet the several HRO features based on a 
specific process phase. 
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In accordance with the proposed framework, three levels of 
compliance have been introduced for assessing how each 
maintenance approach is compliant to both operational and 
strategic HRO characteristics, such as: 
- Low: the feature is present in the analysed approach by 
definition, but it’s not examined in depth, or to which the 
approach is compliant only as a support; 
- Medium: the feature is present in the approach with 
relative importance; 
- High: the feature is present in the approach and is 
emphasized as one of the main pillars. 
 
Figure 3. HRO features organized in the maintenance process 
4. MAINTENANCE APPROACHES FEATURES 
The international scientific literature has been studying 
maintenance approaches for a long time. Garg et al. (2006) 
proposed a critical analysis of the current maintenance 
approaches today applied. These are showed in Table 4.   
Table 4 The main maintenance approaches analysed 
5. CROSS ANALYSIS OF HRO FEATURES AND 
MAINTENANCE APPROACHES 
The evaluation of each maintenance approach according to 
HRO features has been done using, as support, interviews to 
sector’s experts; their judgments have been improved using 
analytical procedures. The assessment grid obtained for the 
operational HRO features is shown in Figure 4. 
In the Normal Condition phase the first feature analysed is 
Sensitivity to operation; in CBM it has an average level as its 
focal point is to monitor system parameters, but it doesn’t 
involve the worker vision for doing the “big picture”. TPM, 
instead, is strongly compliant, in fact workers are directly 
involved in defining the operational status of the day; also 
ECM (medium level) incorporates this principle and uses 
performance indexes that allow to highlight any problem to 
solve. For Engagement with front-line staff, as mentioned 
above, the approaches that fully comply are TPM and ECM. 
For the Alarm phase the characteristic evaluated is 
Reluctance to simplify: the most compliant approach is CBM 
as it analyses each slight overcoming of the threshold value 
of the monitored parameters; TPM is compliant (at a medium 
level) as workers have to manage also weak signals of 
malfunctioning, in particular in the start-up phase of a plant 
(Development Management). Also medium level is given to 
SMM and RBM, which, in order to make respectively a 
model of degradation and a potential risks analysis, have to 
consider any alarm of the system. 
In the Anomalies phase, the first feature is Preoccupation 
with failure: TPM is strongly compliant thanks to the Quality 
Maintenance pillar; CMB has a high level of compliance 
thanks to the sensibility for managing effectively any 
deviations. The RCM is also highly compliant as it identifies 
and corrects anomalies, to preserve the overall system 
functionality. PM is on average compliant as it prevents 
faults only considering MTBF; it does not use anomalies or 
passed faults as informative source for preventing. Also 
ECM, SMM and RBM are typically compliant: the first is 
due to the use of TPM prevention policies (but not with the 
same efficiency), while the last two for the same reasons 
mentioned in the Alarms phase. The Open reporting system is 
present in TPM (Safety, Health and Environment) and ECM 
is highly compliant for the same reason. 
 
Figure 4 Assessment grid of maintenance approaches 








Its aim is to avoid as much as possible the occurrence of failures. PM 
activities are scheduled according to predetermined time intervals or 
criteria (UNI EN 13306, Maintenance—Terminology., 2010). PM 
activities can be also scheduled simultaneously to corrective 




It is a type of PM that considers the real health status of the system or 
component, thanks to monitoring or inspection (UNI EN 13306, 




Is a Japanese maintenance approach focused on eight key elements 
(Nakajima and Bodek, 1988): autonomous maintenance (Bhadury, 
2000), focus improvement, planned maintenance, Quality Maintenance 
(Ollila and Malmipuro, 1999), TPM in offices, Development 




It considers reliability as focus to define maintenance plans. Smith 




Maintenance activities are committed to external parties that are able 




Pun et al. (2002) present the main features of ECM that is based on 
four key points: people participation, maintenance strategy, quality 






It derives from need to define a maintenance-oriented approach to a 
long-term strategic vision (Murthy et al., 2002). Its key features are the 
study of systems’ mechanism degradation through data analysis and 
the use of mathematical models to evaluate the different maintenance 




It derives from will to consider maintenance and safety as linked 
elements, like suggested by some authors (Arunraj and Maiti, 2007) 
(De Carlo et al., 2011).  
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In accordance with the proposed framework, three levels of 
compliance have been introduced for assessing how each 
maintenance approach is compliant to both operational and 
strategic HRO characteristics, such as: 
- Low: the feature is present in the analysed approach by 
definition, but it’s not examined in depth, or to which the 
approach is compliant only as a support; 
- Medium: the feature is present in the approach with 
relative importance; 
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instead, is strongly compliant, in fact workers are directly 
involved in defining the operational status of the day; also 
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SMM and RBM, which, in order to make respectively a 
model of degradation and a potential risks analysis, have to 
consider any alarm of the system. 
In the Anomalies phase, the first feature is Preoccupation 
with failure: TPM is strongly compliant thanks to the Quality 
Maintenance pillar; CMB has a high level of compliance 
thanks to the sensibility for managing effectively any 
deviations. The RCM is also highly compliant as it identifies 
and corrects anomalies, to preserve the overall system 
functionality. PM is on average compliant as it prevents 
faults only considering MTBF; it does not use anomalies or 
passed faults as informative source for preventing. Also 
ECM, SMM and RBM are typically compliant: the first is 
due to the use of TPM prevention policies (but not with the 
same efficiency), while the last two for the same reasons 
mentioned in the Alarms phase. The Open reporting system is 
present in TPM (Safety, Health and Environment) and ECM 
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In the Fault phase Commitment to resilience is the first 
feature: MO is highly compliant, as, being this its core 
business, it’s resilient to respond quickly for managing faults; 
TPM is also highly compliant as maintenance activities are 
made daily as needed (Autonomous Maintenance). ECM has 
medium level as, it needs to respond in resilient way to 
guarantee machines availability. High value were given to 
TPM for Management by exception, as this is a typical 
principle of lean thinking (workers’ commitment and 
intervention only by exception); high value for MO, as the 
firm requiring service may act by exception on the work of 
the supplying firm, if needed (errors or dissatisfaction). 
Abandon work on safety ground is strongly present in TPM 
as workers are trained to have more attention for avoiding 
accidents (Safety, Health and Environment); also for MO, the 
firm requiring service has to protect the supplying firm in 
case of danger (medium level). High compliance for TPM 
and MO for Defence to expertise: the first underlines that 
operators are the most suitable to carry out maintenance 
activities (Autonomous Maintenance), while the second is 
chosen just for its expertise. The last feature is redundancy: a 
high level was estimated for ECM as it uses parallel systems 
to allow faults adjustment without stopping the productivity. 
MO shows a medium level as it should ensure these features 
because of its core business. Low level was been estimated 
for TPM, as lean concepts is in contrast with the redundancy 
feature (Focus improvement pillar). 
For the Post-fault phase, the Root cause analysis is the first 
feature considered: PM is highly compliant, since it could 
consider the root cause of faults to better define the time 
interval between two actions. Also CBM and RCM have a 
high level: for CBM, for example, knowing that temperature 
is the root cause of a fault, it’s possible to choose this 
parameter for the monitoring phase; also for RCM for the 
Functional Failure Analysis. High level is assigned to TPM 
thanks to the Quality Maintenance pillar. Medium level for 
ECM and SMM: ECM needs to identify all fault causes for 
preventing an availability reduction; similarly the study of 
degradation development (SMM) is assisted by the 
knowledge of real causes of degradation. The Procedures 
review feature is quite present in ECM (medium level) and in 
PM, CBM, TPM and RCM (high level). ECM is connected to 
it because of the process efficiency improvement, while PM, 
CBM and RCM for the phase of updating and improvement 
of procedures. TPM is highly compliant with procedures 
review thanks to the focus improvement pillar. Furthermore, 
TPM has a strong bond with the last two features of post-
fault (Individual accountability and Open discussion of 
errors): the operator’s involvement, in fact, is a basic idea of 
this approach that fosters and promotes both of them. ECM 
has a medium link with these two features since it promotes 
people participation.  
The assessment grid for strategic features is shown in Figure 
5. The communication feature (Open communication/Bottom 
up communication of bad news) was identified in TPM and 
ECM, with high level of relationship, since they foster people 
participation. Safety production balance is present in RBM 
and RCM (high level) and in SMM (low level). RCM and 
RBM, in fact, make risk analysis and failure modes analysis, 
respectively, on the basis of what happens in other 
organizations; this is true also for SMM for the definition of 
degradation models. 
 
Figure 5. Assessment grid of maintenance approach 
according to HRO strategic features (H=high, M=medium, 
L=low) 
The Continuous technical training is present in all 
approaches: for this reason it was given at least a low level. 
High level is given for TPM for pillar of Education & 
training and for MO, as maintenance issues are the core 
business of supplying service firms. For Investment of 
resources, MO has a strong relationship since its core 
business too, while a link is more or less present in the other 
approaches. Finally Proactive audits is highly present only in 
TPM because of the Safety Health and Environment pillar.  
To enhance and draw up quantitative information on the 
results obtained in the assessment grids observed above, a 
numerical value has been assigned to each level of 
compliance: low level =1, medium level = 2, high level = 3. 
This will be helpful to see how, at each phase, every 
approach is compliant to the HRO paradigm and which of 
these are compliant both on operational and strategic point of 
view. The first analysis was exploited calculating the score 
obtained considering all of operational and strategic features, 
whose total number is 19. Results are in Figure 6 
 
Figure 6. Maintenance approaches classification 
Data show that TPM has the highest value (88%) followed by 
ECM (51%); MO, CBM and RCM are less compliant (32%, 
30% and 25% respectively) according to the global HRO 
features. Other maintenance approaches (PM, SMM and 
RBM) are less compliant to global HRO features as they are 
only focused on preventive features. In order to deepen the 
analysis, the conformity of maintenance approaches 
respectively for operational (Figure 7 and Figure 8) and 
strategic (Figure 9) features were evaluated. 
INCOM 2015
May 11-13, 2015. Ottawa, Canada
497
470 Serena Andriulo et al. / IFAC-PapersOnLine 48-3 (2015) 466–471 
 
     
 
 
Figure 7. Maintenance approaches according to HRO 
operational features 
TPM is strongly compliant to operational features (93%) and 
the analysis according to HRO maintenance phases confirms 
its attention to lead high reliability in both of preventive and 
resilient phases; also from the strategic point of view, TPM 
has a high level of compliance (73%). ECM follows TPM in 
terms of conformity to operational (55%) and strategic (40%) 
aspects: this is clear as ECM includes most of policies of 
TPM. ECM has a gap of 40% to TPM because of its major 
focalization on preventive phase (Normal Condition 83%, 
Anomalies 83% and Post-Fault 67%), neglecting the resilient 
phase (Fault 33%). From the operational point of view, CBM 
and MO are almost equal in terms of conformity with discreet 
values (respectively 33% and 29%). Analysing each 
maintenance phase, CBM has high values (33%, 100%, 50% 
and 50%) respectively for Normal Condition, Alarms, 
Anomalies and Post Fault, that are prevention phases, but it’s 
completely absent in the resilient phase (Fault). MO, instead, 
has high value in the Fault phase (80%) but it is completely 
absent in the prevention phases. From a strategic point of 
view CBM and MO have different level of compliance (20% 
and 40 % respectively). 
 
Figure 8. Compliance of maintenance approaches for each 
maintenance phases 
RCM, despite the good score for the overall features (25%), 
is poorly compliant to the operational features (21%), while 
is more compliant considering the strategic ones (33%). 
Other approaches (PM, SMM and RBM) confirm their low 
accordance with HRO both in the operational and in the 
strategic fields: the main cause is their great focus only on the 
prevention dimension. 
 
Figure 9. Maintenance approaches according to HRO 
strategic features 
After this analysis, two types of maintenance approaches are 
identified according to HRO, and these are Starting HRO and 
HRO experts. The first one is suggested to all organizations 
that want to start to use the HRO paradigm in their policies: 
these maintenance approaches can help them to begin small. 
For this category an example could be the ECM as it is 
present both in preventive and resilient phases, in spite it has 
low value in resilient phase. The second one is suggested to 
all organizations that have a strong expertise to use HRO 
paradigm, so these maintenance approaches can optimize 
their compliance according HRO standard. For this category, 
an example could be TPM that is highly careful to be reliable 
in both preventive and resilient phases. 
6. CONCLUSION 
A rough but effective analysis is proposed in this paper to 
evaluate the different maintenance approaches. Both strategic 
and operational aspects are considered; furthermore, the main 
features of HRO were correlated to each main maintenance 
management process. Thus, a numeric not structured analysis 
was carried out aiming at assessing the level of compliance 
characterizing each maintenance approach towards HRO 
features. This application is a preliminary study. Further 
development will be oriented to apply more quantitative and 
structured analysis, for example basing on a multi-criteria 
model such as AHP. 
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